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Abstract 
 
This project was undertaken as part of the Executive MBA at the International Hellenic 
University.  
Globalization, fueled by technology advances in the fields of communication, computer 
science and transportation, increased cross border linkages and interdependence. 
Foreign investment became a vital part of economic activity. However, investors exhibit 
lack of uniformity in their asset allocation. Literature and accumulated research suggest 
that equity, corporate and government bond investment demonstrate strong home bias, 
which supports market disintegration and leaves scope for diversification opportunities. 
This project demonstrates the importance of the sovereign bond market. 
Simultaneously, uses contemporary empirical data to assess diversification 
opportunities and market integration. The last issue is also studied on European Union 
level. This work confirms that sovereign bond market is getting more and more 
popularity. Bonds do not exhibit similar behavior to equities. Financial crisis causes less 
interdependence between bond markets, contrary to common belief. No “free lunch”, 
seems to be offered in the long run to bond investors. Currency hedging depresses risk 
figures but does not affect returns systematically to any direction (either positive, or 
negative). Lastly, European bond markets integration lost its pace due to financial 
distress. This fact has serious political consequences, affecting ultimately European 
political integration. 
I would like to thank my supervisors Dr Stergios Leventis and Dr Christos Grose for 
their valuable support.  
Keywords: sovereign bond, home bias, diversification, free lunch 
 
Christos Giarlelis 
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1. Introduction 
 
Globalization, fueled by technology advances in the fields of communication, computer 
science and transportation, increased cross border linkages and interdependence. This 
phenomenon inevitably, altered investment decision making. The factors that affect 
national economic activity have largely differentiated. Foreign investment became a 
vital part of economic activity. However, investors exhibit lack of uniformity in their 
asset allocation. Each country’s foreign investor base is quite different. It seems that 
features related to geography and investment sentiment dominate economic variables.  
Literature and accumulated research suggest that equity, corporate and government 
bond investment demonstrate strong home bias, which supports market disintegration 
and leaves scope for diversification opportunities (French and Poterba, 1991; 
Coeurbacier and Rey, 2011; Mishra, 2012). While equity home bias monopolized 
interest in research (Tesar and Werner, 1995; Ahearne et al., 2004; Coeurdacier and 
Rey, 2011), bond counterpart became popular only recently (Burger and Warnock, 
2003; Polwitoon and Tawatnuntachai, 2006).  
Home bias, in bond investments, influences market integration negatively. The 
consequences for sovereign debt are harsh; incremented interest rates and subsequent 
debt burden passed from current to future generations. The problem exacerbates when 
demographical trends of developed countries are taken into account. 
This business project focuses on sovereign bond market. Bond investors seem to exhibit 
an unexpected behavior. They prefer a domestic bond portfolio instead of an 
international equivalent, despite the favorable characteristics, in terms of return and risk 
figures, the latter may offer (Levich and Thomas, 1993). Term “free lunch”, introduced 
by Perold and Shulman (1988), describes better return / risk tradeoffs prevailing in 
financial markets, contrary to inferior domestic equivalents. Levich (2001) argued that 
US investors could have realized incremented returns matched with significantly 
depressed risk figures, if invested internationally rather than domestically. 
Growing literature on the possible rationale behind home country bias depicts five main 
causes: 
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1. Exchange rate risk (Michaelides, 2003; Hau and Rey, 2004; Gourinchas and 
Rey, 2005) 
2. Transaction costs (Tesar and Werner, 1995) 
3. Information asymmetries (Ahearne et al., 2004) 
4. Geographical proximity (Portes and Rey, 2005) 
5. Psychological reasons relating to investing to known instead of unknown 
securities (Huberman, 2001) 
Exchange rate risk is believed to be a crucial factor that influences foreign holdings 
(Fratzscher, Thimann, 2007). The adoption of the European single currency (Euro), 
which eliminated exchange rate risk for many investors, supported market 
consolidation. Globalization is an ongoing procedure, which also contributes to market 
integration. As the integration of financial markets grows, investors actively seek 
diversification opportunities for their portfolios. Inevitably, questions about the 
existence of diversification opportunities, currently, are raised. 
This project aims to stress the importance of the sovereign bond market and assess the 
opportunity of diversification gains, using contemporary data. Employing the Levich 
(2001) methodology, market integration is tested and diversification gains are explored, 
on an unhedged, as well as on a hedged basis, for a US-based investor. The US 
perspective is adopted based solely on market importance criteria. Financial crisis and 
its implications to the market are also questioned. Special attention is drawn upon the 
European markets and their integration characteristics. Finally, an inevitable 
comparison of empirical evidence with the respective of Levich (2001) is attempted. 
This project adopts the following pattern. Initially, the fundamentals of the sovereign 
bond market are presented in chapter two. Statistical data stress the importance of the 
market and point out crucial participants. The literature review, in the third chapter, 
gives an insight of home, equity and bond, bias observed over time. Focus is placed on 
exchange rate risk and currency hedging, as it is a crucial impediment to market 
integration. A special subunit is dedicated to European Monetary Union and its 
implications to bond market convergence. 
Research work follows. The methodology and dataset that will be applied in the 
analysis are explained, in chapter four. Chapter five presents analytically the empirical 
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evidence resulted by data processing, while the next chapter analyzes the implications 
of the preceded evidence.  
Conclusions summarize the main findings of this project. The most distinguishing 
interpretations are related to unobserved diversification gains when, equally weighted, 
international (non US$) and global portfolios are formed. Hedging had undoubtedly 
reduced risk, at the same time no implications to returns had been observed. The most 
efficient investing choice would be the UK market, which was the only one that offered 
positive average returns. No free lunch, namely increased returns accompanied with 
depressed risk figures, was observed. Financial distress had seriously affected our 
concluding remarks; this is validated by breaking down our dataset in two sub-periods. 
Market integration was found to be weak, especially during the years of financial 
turmoil. Reasons related to geographical proximity influence bond returns correlation. 
Finally, European Union countries exhibited an impressive convergence, which was 
repealed due to financial crisis.  
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2. Sovereign Bond Market 
 
This chapter provides, initially, a conceptual framework of the bonds and some of their 
key measurements. This project analyses the sovereign bond market. Sovereign bonds 
comprise a vital part of public debt. Consequently, a separate section is devoted to debt 
composition. The following sections provide an insight to sovereign bond market size 
and incremented importance, as well as country-specific bond yield evolution for the 
period under scrutiny.  
2.1 Bond essentials - Terminology 
Bond is a debt security that is used to finance companies and governments. This 
security is issued at a certain nominal value (face or par value). This value corresponds 
to the amount that the issuer borrows today, accompanied by an obligation to pay 
interest in certain time intervals (annually or semi-annually) and redeem face (or par) 
value at an expiration (or maturity) date. Interest payments are known as coupon 
payments. Bonds are issued and sold in primary markets; bond holders and investors 
have though the opportunity to trade, in secondary markets.  
Most bonds promise a fixed, nominal rate of interest. The real interest rate that is 
realized by the bondholder depends on inflation rate. The higher the inflation rate, the 
lower the real interest rate realized. Some bonds offer inflation rate protection by 
indexing inflation to coupon payments. 
From the preceded analysis we conclude that bonds offer a series of cash flows, namely 
coupon payments and face value at maturity. Bond price comprises present value of 
these cash flows. This actually implies an inverse relationship between interest rates and 
bond prices. Long term maturity bonds are more sensitive to interest rate changes, since 
the major, discounted, cash flow (i.e. face value) occurs at the end of the long term 
period. The rates used to discount cash flows are known as spot rates. The difference 
between successive period’s spot rates is the forward rate. If we want to depict these 
spot rates in relation to cash flow maturity, we obtain a slope, recognized as the bond 
yield curve, or term structure of interest rates. 
This curve can be either upward or downward sloping, depending on interest rate 
fluctuations over time. There are two main theories concerning term structure of interest 
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rates; Expectations theory and Liquidity preference theory. The first, states that -in 
equilibrium- forward rates are equal to respective expected spot rates; consequently an 
upward slope of the curve is attributed to anticipated short term interest rate rise and 
vice versa. The latter theory states that investors seek compensation for holding a long 
term maturing bond. In this case, the forward rate must be higher than the expected spot 
rate. The difference between the two rates is known as liquidity premium. Liquidity 
premium is also justified when we incorporate inflation in our analysis. 
Instead of using multiple spot rates to calculate present value of bond cash flows, there 
is also the alternative of a single rate applying to all of them. This rate of return, known 
as Yield to Maturity, equals to the yield that an investor realizes, if he possesses the 
bond until its maturity date.  
2.2 Government Debt Composition - Implications 
Bonds act as a major instrument for government financing. However, there are also 
other financial instruments available. A definition of government debt given by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is “Debt is defined 
as a specific subset of liabilities identified according to the types of financial 
instruments included or excluded. Debt is thus obtained as the sum of the following 
liability categories (as applicable): currency and deposits; securities other than shares, 
except financial derivatives; loans; insurance technical reserves; and other accounts 
payable.” OECD (2017). 
The category “Securities other than shares” comprises bonds, of all kinds (regular, zero 
coupon), treasury bills and certificates of deposit. Loans have the characteristic of being 
evidenced by non negotiable documents and can be either bilateral between individual 
countries, or multilateral, between a government and a series of other countries or an 
organization. (SNA, 1993) 
Debt can have many characteristics in terms of denominating currency, maturity, 
indexation (to inflation or to real GDP changes) and investor base. These characteristics 
influence government borrowing, while simultaneously they affect debt refinancing 
ability. The composition of government debt is crucial for many macroeconomic 
reasons (Lojsch et al., 2011). First of all, average maturity affects the yield curve which 
acts as a benchmark for pricing private sector bonds. Ultimately, higher government 
borrowing affects private sector financing rates and causes crowding out effects in the 
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economy. Secondly, in cases of incremented monetary policy rates, an increased share 
of short term debt absorbs valuable resources, necessary for advancing economic 
activity. Additionally, Wolswijk and De Haan (2005) claim that “issuing inflation-
indexed bonds may reduce the incentives for governments to put pressure on central 
banks to tolerate higher inflation with a view to reducing the real value of government 
debt”.  
Currency denomination is also very crucial. Foreign currency denomination implies a 
mismatch between interest expenditure and tax revenues, since the latter are expressed 
in domestic currency terms. Lastly, the share of foreign investors in the total investor 
base affects debt refinancing conditions, in case of unexpected capital controls. 
These two subsections provided a brief insight of the bond functionality, its relationship 
to interest rates, as well as of the sovereign debt composition and its characteristics. 
Bonds are the main financing tool for governments and constitute the major –but not the 
sole- part of sovereign debt. The composition of debt and its characteristics affect 
economy performance.  
2.3 Size and Importance 
Sovereign bond market has attracted incremented interest in the world’s financial 
markets. Boosted interest derives from both, supply and demand, sides. Central 
governments, government controlled entities and corporations issue bonds in an effort 
to cover increasing funding requirements. On the other hand, investors, both private and 
institutional, opt for fixed income investments, especially during economy downturns.  
After the “dot com” bubble burst in the beginning of year 2000, world economy started 
to revive. Consequent years, up to 2008, exhibited strong signs of expansion. 
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Figure 1. Global Outlook - Real GDP Change until Year 2008  
 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2006) envisages world growth, until year 2008, in 
the Figure 1 above. Equity markets absorbed an abundance of funds and major stock 
market indices recorded highs. Governments also exploited liquidity surplus, by issuing 
bonds to cover their deficits. 
Eurostat (2017) depicts the evolution of government finances for the period 2004-2014, 
under Table 1. It is obvious that influential economies such as European Union, U.S.A., 
Japan, Canada and Australia recorded deficits. Accumulated deficits boosted gross 
national debt.  
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Table 1. General Government Finances 2004-2014 
 
Data from Bank for International Settlements provide an insight to this market and its 
increasing size. Year 2003 recorded US$ 18.6 trillion of government bonds outstanding. 
Consequent years exhibited an upward trend. Just before the 2008 housing market crisis 
in the US and the domino effects in world economy, the value of sovereign bonds 
outstanding was US$ 24.9 trillion (2007).  
From 2008 and onwards, the financial crisis, which affected all major economies, 
influenced market size dramatically. Governments absorbed funds to support national 
bank systems and major insurance companies via bond market. AIG, a major US 
pension fund, was capitalized by the US government, whereas the same occurred in the 
case of Royal Bank of Scotland in the UK. European Union weak economies such as 
Greece and Portugal run bank capitalization programs. Spain received € 41.4 billion 
from European Stability Mechanism for the same purpose. Equity markets recorded 
lows and investors flew to secure, fixed income, investments. World economy 
deceleration is presented in Figure 2, adopting IMF (2014) data. Growth rates remained 
at low levels for both advanced and emerging markets. 
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Figure 2. Real GDP Growth (%) 2010 - 2015 
 
The results of the expansionary policy discussed above, are reflected in the vast changes 
of market size (2009: US$ 32.3 trillion, 2016: US$ 45.6 trillion). Below we interpreted 
data from the Bank for International Settlements database.  
Initially, under Figure 3, we present the structure of the market as it was shaped at the 
end of year 2016, by selecting major country participants. United States dominate the 
market, followed closely by Japan. European countries constitute a small part, while, 
under the category “Rest”, China is becoming an important player. 
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Figure 3. Sovereign Bond Market Structure, Year 2016 
 
The dominance of the US, justifies the adoption of the US investor perspective, later, in 
our analysis. Table 2 depicts sovereign bond market evolution per country, for the 
period 2003-2016. 
All numerical data presented in this section stress the incremented importance of the 
sovereign bond market. National debt figures that are directly related to sovereign bonds 
have strong impact on future generations. The crucial changes in market size attracted, 
gradually, research work on investment decision making features and behavior.  
 
 
37% 
6% 
23% 
4% 
4% 
5% 
2% 
19% 
Sovereign Bond Market Structure Year 2016 
US 
UK 
Japan 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Canada 
Rest 
[11] 
 
Table 2. General Government Debt Securities Outstanding. Period 2003-2016 (in billion US$) 
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria 
165 181 164 191 219 220 243 240 242 286 309 284 262 271 
Belgium 
329 351 309 343 399 408 442 438 451 465 492 442 406 437 
Cyprus 
  9 8 9 10 7 10 10 12 13 11 9 7 8 
Finland 
73 81 68 75 81 74 91 100 105 114 127 121 114 115 
France 
1,056 1,236 1,141 1,301 1,514 1,563 1,843 1,838 1,926 2,064 2,262 2,084 1,934 2,051 
Germany 
1,184 1,380 1,273 1,494 1,717 1,663 1,870 2,040 2,079 2,178 2,255 2,000 1,779 1,833 
Greece 
175 216 207 244 299 340 408 383 357 141 128 100 82 81 
Ireland 
36 43 37 41 46 58 121 130 111 119 154 145 137 139 
Italy 
1,471 1,637 1,469 1,690 1,928 1,920 2,114 2,069 2,078 2,183 2,391 2,181 1,986 2,090 
Latvia 
          4 3 3 3 6 6 8 8 8 
Lithuania 
  4 4 5 7 6 10 12 13 14 15 15 15 15 
Luxemburg 
  1       3 3 5 5 7 8 8 7 7 
Malta 
  4 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 7 6 6 6 
Netherlands 
257 293 260 279 308 395 389 394 401 438 481 434 380 377 
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Portugal 
83 98 100 118 136 142 170 187 168 173 178 156 150 168 
Slovakia 
12 15 13 17 21 23 29 34 35 44 47 43 39 41 
Slovenia 
8 9 8 10 11 11 17 17 20 22 31 33 32 33 
Spain 
418 462 408 452 498 543 746 796 871 973 1,135 1,057 998 1,053 
Denmark 
123 148 107 106 103 122 128 137 157 162 155 150 122 136 
Norway 
42 42 38 44 48 52 97 102 86 106 94 78 68 80 
Sweden 
164 183 157 175 168 126 147 167 152 166 194 182 174 160 
UK 
639 798 802 964 1,068 988 1,426 1,688 2,090 2,282 2,408 2,699 2,615 2,690 
Australia 
110 117 114 122 147 143 260 376 488 577 521 569 541 619 
Canada 
640 683 709 718 836 766 1,015 1,145 1,206 1,315 1,302 1,208 1,073 1,155 
Japan 
5,547 6,240 5,801 5,807 6,162 8,038 8,258 10,065 11,232 10,538 9,036 8,205 8,337 10,504 
US 
5,159 6,458 6,848 7,122 7,479 8,774 10,376 12,045 13,073 14,183 14,768 15,556 16,254 16,736 
Rest 
996 1,129 1,256 1,375 1,765 1,793 2,104 2,408 2,561 2,828 3,101 3,135 3,816 4,792 
Total 
18,687 21,818 21,305 22,706 24,975 28,187 32,325 36,834 39,928 41,403 41,616 40,908 41,342 45,605 
Adapted from Bank for International Settlements, https://www.bis.org/ 
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While absolute figures are indicative of the upward trend in bond value outstanding, the 
importance of the market is commonly presented via relative measures, such as Gross 
Debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio. As already pointed out, bond value 
outstanding comprises a major part of sovereign debt. 
The above ratio is well known for its importance. This relative measure was also 
included in the Maastricht criteria set for the common European Currency. Tables 3 and 
4 below, depict Gross Debt to GDP ratio for all major countries presented in Figure 3. 
The period 2003-2016 was split in two sub-periods in order to highlight the upward 
trend in debt figures, especially in turbulent times. However, we must take into account 
that incremented Debt to GDP ratios stem also from decreasing GDP, which occurred 
repeatedly in the sub-period 2008-2016 of economic downturn. 
The upward trend in Gross Debt to GDP ratio in the second and more recent sub-period 
is obvious. While in Table 3 someone can group the countries presented in three groups, 
namely low indebted (UK), averagely indebted (US, Canada, Germany, France) and 
highly indebted (Japan, Italy), Table 4 presents a more uniform setting. Most countries’ 
ratios range from 79% to 96%. The cases of Japan and Italy are quite different. Both 
countries and especially Japan are characterized by extremely high levels of gross debt. 
The implications of high levels of gross debt are harsh. In the following chapters all 
possible side effects of this phenomenon are going to be explained. At this point, we 
focus on the incremented importance of the bond and ultimately the debt market. 
In the following subsection we are going to present the average yields of the sovereign 
bonds of the countries presented so far. By presenting these data we capture a holistic 
view of the bond market and its characteristics. 
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Table 3 Gross Debt to GDP ratio % Period 2003-2007 
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2003-2007 
US 58.5% 65.4% 64.9% 63.8% 64.4% 63.4% 
UK 35.9% 38.8% 40.1% 41.0% 42.0% 39.6% 
Japan 169.6% 180.7% 186.4% 186.0% 183.0% 181.1% 
Canada 76.6% 72.6% 71.6% 70.3% 66.5% 71.5% 
Germany 63.1% 64.8% 67.0% 66.5% 63.7% 65.0% 
France 64.1% 65.7% 67.1% 64.4% 64.3% 65.1% 
Italy 100.5% 100.1% 101.9% 102.6% 99.8% 101.0% 
Adapted from Eurostat and IMF databases 
Table 4 Gross Debt to GDP ratio % Period 2008-2016 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2008-2016 
US 73.3% 86.3% 95.2% 99.4% 102.7% 100.9% 102.1% 101.2% 104.8% 96.2% 
UK 50.2% 64.5% 76.0% 81.6% 85.1% 86.2% 88.1% 89.0% 89.3% 78.9% 
Japan 191.8% 210.2% 216.0% 230.3% 238.0% 240.5% 242.1% 237.9% 250.4% 228.5% 
Canada 71.3% 81.3% 83.1% 83.5% 85.3% 85.8% 85.4% 91.5% 92.3% 84.4% 
Germany 65.1% 72.6% 81.0% 78.7% 79.9% 77.5% 74.9% 71.2% 68.3% 74.4% 
France 68.0% 78.9% 81.6% 85.2% 89.5% 92.3% 94.9% 95.6% 96.0% 86.9% 
Italy 102.4% 112.5% 115.4% 116.5% 123.4% 129.0% 131.8% 132.1% 132.6% 121.7% 
Adapted from Eurostat and IMF databases 
 
[15] 
 
2.4 Long Term Yields of Sovereign Bonds 
The data presented in the preceded section emphasized on the importance and the 
increasing size of the bond market. This subsection presents what an investor should 
expect when investing in such bonds. Table 5 below presents all yields of 10 year 
maturity bonds for the countries presented so far. The selection of the 10 year bond is 
directly related to our research methodology. 
Table 5 Long Term (10 Year) Bond Yield Evolution Period 2003-2016 
Year US UK Japan Canada Germany France Italy 
2003 4.02% 4.53% 1.00% 4.81% 4.07% 4.13% 4.30% 
2004 4.27% 4.88% 1.49% 4.58% 4.04% 4.10% 4.26% 
2005 4.29% 4.41% 1.36% 4.07% 3.35% 3.41% 3.56% 
2006 4.79% 4.50% 1.74% 4.21% 3.76% 3.80% 4.05% 
2007 4.63% 5.01% 1.67% 4.27% 4.22% 4.30% 4.49% 
2008 3.67% 4.59% 1.47% 3.61% 3.98% 4.23% 4.68% 
2009 3.26% 3.65% 1.33% 3.23% 3.22% 3.65% 4.31% 
2010 3.21% 3.62% 1.15% 3.24% 2.74% 3.12% 4.04% 
2011 2.79% 3.14% 1.10% 2.78% 2.61% 3.32% 5.42% 
2012 1.80% 1.92% 0.84% 1.87% 1.50% 2.54% 5.49% 
2013 2.35% 2.39% 0.69% 2.26% 1.57% 2.20% 4.32% 
2014 2.54% 2.57% 0.52% 2.23% 1.16% 1.67% 2.89% 
2015 2.14% 1.90% 0.35% 1.52% 0.50% 0.84% 1.71% 
2016 1.84% 1.30% -0.07% 1.25% 0.09% 0.47% 1.49% 
Adapted from OECD database 
The yield evolution is clearly trending down. This decrease stems from macroeconomic 
variables. The financial crisis affected yields and as economic recovery seems distant, 
low yield levels persist. Inflation rates remain closely tight to zero, affecting negatively 
nominal interest rates. Investors prefer investments with low risk of default, such as 
sovereign bonds of major economies. Characteristic cases are Germany and Japan. An 
investor would realize a yield close to zero if he had invested in German long term 
bonds. The German economy seems to be a safe harbor for investors. Japan on the other 
hand, records negative yields; this actually implies that investors willing to buy such 
bonds actually pay a fee to secure their funds. 
Bond investments are the focal point of interest in this project. Research suggests that 
investors exhibit an unexpected behavior when investing in bonds. They tend to prefer 
domestic bonds than exploiting bond portfolio diversification opportunities, by 
allocating their funds abroad. The odd character of this behavior is reinforced by the 
observation that this preference remains, even if risk - return figures prove the 
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superiority of international investing. The literature review that follows provides an 
insight to bond investment behavior. 
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3. Literature Review 
 
This literature review initiates by introducing the term “home bias” in investment 
decisions and the theoretical models for measuring this phenomenon. It is more than 
obvious that, primarily, equity investment monopolized interest; mainly due to its 
market importance. As bond markets grew, relevant research followed their pace and 
home bias in bond investments came, gradually, under scrutiny.  
3.1 Introduction to “home bias” in investment 
The merits of international diversification opportunities were firstly pointed out by 
Grubel (1968); Levy and Sarnat (1970); Solnik (1974). Although these opportunities 
exist and offer superior performance, domestic assets are overweighted in portfolios. 
There is vast literature and research, initially in equity and latterly in bond “home bias”. 
The phenomenon is described as “the fact that investors are found to hold 
disproportionately larger share of their wealth in domestic portfolios as compared to 
predictions of standard portfolio theory” (Mishra, 2012).  
There are two approaches when measuring home bias; the model based and the return 
based approach (Mishra, 2012). Both measures compare actual portfolio holdings to a 
benchmark. The model based approach adopts International Capital Asset Pricing 
Model -ICAPM – (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965), which implies asset allocation 
according to each country’s contribution to world capitalization. The return based 
approach uses a time series of returns and reaches its conclusions based on mean – 
variance optimization procedures. 
3.2 Reasons for “home bias” in equity and bond investments 
French & Poterba (1991), in an influential paper, suggest that investors are dominated 
by home country bias in their equity investments. Same results occurred in a recent 
study by Ahearne et al. (2004) and Coeurdacier and Rey (2011). At the same time, 
international equity markets offer unexploited diversification opportunities. Portfolio 
theory states that investors should allocate their funds to low return-correlated 
investments, in an effort to diminish portfolio risk. The reasons that lie behind this 
irrational behavior are not found to be related to institutional barriers, such as capital 
flows constraints, taxes and transaction costs (French &Poterba, 1991). Irrational 
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investor choices are attributed to human behavioral characteristics. Local investors seem 
to perceive expected returns for their home country, as well as for foreign markets, quite 
differently compared to their foreign counterparts (Huberman, 2001, Strong & Xu, 
2003, Broner et al. 2014). Additionally, investors adopt their investing policy for 
foreign assets based on statistical and historical data, while they are not in the position 
to form perspectives for general foreign economic activity or for foreign firms’ 
performances. 
While the theme of equity home bias lured researchers, bond counterpart was less 
popular. Tesar & Werner (1995) studied equity, corporate and government bond 
investment during years 1970-1990 for USA, UK, Canada, Germany and Japan. Their 
sample demonstrates home bias in national portfolios, despite increasing foreign asset 
holdings as time passes by. USA portfolios had relatively more Canadian assets that the 
model suggested and vice versa. This observation stresses the importance of 
geographical proximity in investment decision making (also Levy and Lerman, 1988; 
Cappiello, Engle and Sheppard, 2006). Sorensen et al. (2007) find a rapid decline in 
home bias from 1993 to 2003 for equity and bond investments. Burger and Warnock 
(2003) focused solely on bond portfolios held by US investors during 1997 (end) – 2001 
(end), across 50 countries. They find significant home bias. Portfolio weights are greater 
in countries that present more open capital accounts. Additionally countries with strong 
institutions and better inflation performance have larger local currency bond markets. 
Dahlquist et al. (2002) underlined the importance of corporate governance in home bias. 
Incremented costs to access foreign assets, encourages domestic overinvestment. 
Multinational companies are also contributing to home bias. Philips (2012) suggested 
that company’s performance is highly correlated to domestic market, irrespective the 
place of business conduct. 
Polwitoon & Tawatnuntachai (2006) argue the importance of bond investments. As the 
generation of baby boomers approaches retirement, demand for fixed income securities 
will be increasing. The two researchers also admit that empirical research focused on 
equity investments, neglecting bond equivalents. While they witness an incremented 
financial importance of global bond funds, “the question of whether US investors can 
gain diversification gains by investing in global funds still remains, at best, 
inconclusive”. Their research work compared global bond funds to domestic 
equivalents, for a period covering years 1993 to 2004, in risk - return terms, applying 
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Sharpe ratios. They suggested that the addition of global funds to a domestic portfolio 
enhances return by 0.5%-1% on an annual basis, leaving risk stable. The diversification 
gains remain even in volatile market conditions, contrary to conventional belief. Lastly, 
Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2016) suggest that bonds are used as a hedge tool for 
exchange rate risk and connect this hedge to equity home bias. Research on fixed 
income securities could have a positive impact on borrowing cost for governments. 
3.3 Importance of Exchange Rate Risk in “home bias” 
Key factor that hinders bond market integration is exchange rate risk. Superior 
performance is often absorbed by adverse exchange rate parities. Exchange rate 
volatility could be neutralized by deploying currency hedging strategies. These 
strategies can be broadly classified in two groups; passive and active hedging. Passive 
hedging describes an “always” hedge or “no hedge” strategy, where currency positions 
are taken irrespective of market conditions. On the contrary, active hedging strategies 
are properly applied depending on currency parity forecasts. Many researchers argue 
that active hedging proves ineffective and boosts transaction costs, eliminating 
simultaneously diversification gains. Passive hedging, on the other hand, seems to be a 
better choice for investors. Currency risk management is a quite disputable issue. 
Levich and Thomas (1993) found that US investors would have earned higher returns 
on unhedged foreign bonds, than on US bonds. Clacher et al. (2004) also opt for passive 
hedging techniques, in an updated work. 
Much of research work in currency risk hedging is based on an influential paper of 
Perold & Schulman (1988) who proved that if a US investor preferred solely 
international investments, he would materialize same returns with much less associated 
risk, when currency risk was hedged. The existence of enhanced returns accompanied, 
simultaneously, with less risk, is known as “free lunch”. In the long run, currency 
hedging should be perceived as a zero expected return tool, which, simultaneously, is a 
prerequisite for enhanced returns from foreign assets. Levich (2001) adopted a US 
investor perspective, for a period covering years 1977-1990 and proved that 
international bond portfolios, when they are passively hedged against currency risk (he 
adopted a rolling hedge to derive conclusions), offer superior returns and Return to Risk 
ratios compared to US counterparts. Consequently, there are diversification 
opportunities in bond markets. Levich addresses this diversification as “central bank 
risk diversification” and argues that it could be the key when confronting domestic 
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interest rate volatility. His empirical work also supports a home country bias in 
domestic securities. 
Hunter & Simon (2004) studied US, Germany, United Kingdom and Japan bond 
markets for a period covering 1992-2002 and found risk diversification opportunities for 
US investors on a currency hedged basis. The hedge was implemented via a rolling 
forward contract, where ex post returns are hedged perfectly. Even though correlation of 
bond returns increases during the years of the study, it was found to be significantly less 
than unity, supporting their argument of diversification gains. Interestingly, this was not 
found to be the case for equity investments, where the correlation of returns approaches 
unity, especially during erratic market conditions. When the latter prevail, risk 
diversification opportunities still remain, according to the researchers. The main factor 
that drove bond returns was lagged equity equivalents. Another interesting suggestion 
was the high correlation of returns between US and UK or Germany, whereas the 
Japanese market seemed to be less correlated. Contemporary research of Fidora et al. 
(2007) alleges that investors refrain from international securities because they have to 
bear currency risk. Their empirical work argues that as average currency return 
volatility approaches zero, demand for domestic securities dwindles by 60%. Philips et 
al. (2014) argue that during short time periods, the impact of currency hedging is 
insignificant and should not interfere in investment decision making. However, this is 
not the case in the long run. 
3.4 European Monetary Union – Implications to bond market 
This section addresses separately literature on European Monetary Union (EMU) and its 
implications to bond investments. Free capital flows between EU member states 
accompanied with the launch of the common currency (Euro) in 2001, which eliminated 
currency risk for many investors, boosted bond market convergence. 
Lane (2006) studied the change in the composition of European portfolios during the 
years 1997 to 2004. Cross investment among euro area members is substantially greater 
than among other country pairs, suggesting euro-area bias. Supporting research to euro-
area bias was conducted by De Santis and Gerard (2006), De Santis and Luehrmann 
(2009). 
Haselmann and Herwartz (2010) analyzed the determinants of investment behavior after 
the EMU and the advent of the Euro, adopting a German investor perspective. They 
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studied a long period expanding from 1980 to 2003. Their research suggests that 
German investors reduced their share in domestic assets and increased allocation in 
European and rest of the world equivalents. The observed reduction in domestic bond 
holdings reached 17%, while the European bond counterparts increased by 15%. The 
reasoning for this behavior is rooted to the exchange rate risk disappearance and the 
unobserved market imperfections in the common European market. 
Abad et al. (2010) investigated EMU countries’ bond markets for diversification 
opportunities. Their sample went from January 1999 to June 2008. Their evidence 
supports that there is incomplete integration in world and EMU bond markets. 
Government bond returns of European countries that do not participate in EMU are 
driven by world risk factors. On the other hand, Eurozone bond markets are affected by 
corresponding risk factors. Despite that, German bond market exhibits only partial 
integration with EMU bond markets, probably owed to market liquidity and risk of 
default. Cunado and Puig (2011) also suggest that there are still diversification 
opportunities in EMU bond markets, despite evidence of multiple cointegration. 
In the same context, Laopodis (2008) examined bond returns of ten Eurozone members 
and three European bond markets that do not participate in the common currency 
(Denmark, Norway, UK). The sample period included years 1995-2006 and was split in 
pre – and after Euro era. Laopodis validated that Eurozone bond markets are more 
correlated after the adoption of the Euro. He moved one step further and argued that as 
EMU bond markets integrate, the harder will be for the European Central Bank (ECB) 
to manage long term interest rates and follow an anti-inflationary policy. European bond 
markets will continue to be less integrated as countries of south – east Europe join the 
Euro. 
Lastly, contemporary work of Christiansen (2014) continues to support advanced 
integration in bond markets between EMU countries, in contrast to non EMU countries. 
New European country members exhibit less correlation, compared to older member 
states. During the last period of turmoil, bond market integration became lower, 
especially for EMU member states. 
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4. Methodology & Data 
 
The methodology adopted is similar to Levich (2001), enabling us to compare empirical 
evidence and update conclusions. This project adopts a US investor perspective, based 
on the importance of the US bond market, as already presented in the second chapter, 
and the large individual and institutional investor base. This implies that home currency 
is considered to be the US$, when measuring returns. 
4.1 Return and Risk on Unhedged and Hedged basis – Comparative 
Measures 
4.1.1 Return and Risk on Unhedged Basis 
The return of a foreign bond has three components: 
1. Interest income accrued. 
2. Capital gain or loss. This part is rooted in the inverse relationship between bond 
price and interest rates. 
3. Foreign exchange gain or loss when converting the two items above in home 
currency terms. 
We consider that the bonds utilized in the analysis carry no credit default risk. The 
creditworthiness of the issuer implies additional sources of gain or loss. The variables of 
our analysis are summarized in the Table 6 below: 
Table 6. Variables used in Calculus 
Variable Annotation 
   Initial price of the bond. Purchase price 
   Spot Exchange rate in US$/Foreign Currency 
      Value of the bond, a month later. 
      Price change, monthly 
     Accrued interest, monthly 
 
The value of the foreign bond in US$ terms is  
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While                     
The continuous rate of return on the foreign bond, on an unhedged basis, is 
          
           
     
      
     
  
     
     
  
                      
Equation 1 implies that the return of a foreign bond comprises the return of the bond in 
foreign currency terms and the return of the foreign currency.  
The risk of such a holding can be summarized in the variance equation below: 
      
  
            
                                     
Total risk stems from individual return variability of bond returns and foreign currency 
counterparts, plus a covariance term. Covariance term can exhibit both positive and 
negative figures, depending on market conditions. Inflation drives interest and currency 
rates reversely. Upward inflation trends result in interest rate increase and depress both 
bond and foreign currency returns and vice versa, leading to a positive covariance term.  
On the other hand, a tight monetary policy provokes interest rate increases. Interest rates 
and bond prices are negatively related, so bond return loses are inevitable. High interest 
rates lure foreign capital and lead to currency rates appreciation. The financial situation 
described above leads to a negative covariance term in Equation 2. 
Lastly, low interest rate environment leads to positive bond returns. Simultaneously, 
this environment endorses capital outflows that result in weaker currency market. These 
conditions also result to a negative covariance term between the two variables in 
Equation 2.  
4.1.2 Return and Risk on Hedged Basis 
The analysis presented under the previous subsection stresses the importance of the 
currency return variability. Currency risk is crucial and –if not hedged- may either 
absorb any bond return gains, or amplify them as a result of a favorable exchange rate 
movement.  
Investors use a wide range of financial tools to combat currency risk. The most 
straightforward is a forward contract. The forward contract describes a commitment to 
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buy or sell foreign currency on a future date in a predefined parity. A possible hedge 
strategy comprises selling a forward currency contract (denoted as Ft) equal with next 
month’s bond estimated value with accrued interest. 
                           
If there are no estimation errors, a perfect hedge will occur (           ). The return of 
such a bond is: 
         
        
     
      
     
  
     
  
  
                    
Equation 4 above also splits bond return in two pieces. The first is the bond return in 
foreign currency terms and the second is the one month forward premium. 
Risk measured in variance terms is equal to: 
         
         
                                      
The variance of hedged returns is less than the unhedged counterpart. This is a result of 
the less volatility associated with forward premium than the exchange rate.  
The estimation error is denoted as: 
                  
Finally, the foreign bond returns in US$ terms and on a currency hedged basis follows: 
         
     
  
     
  
  
       
           
        
           
In the above equation, the last term is negligible for short term investments. In our 
analysis we are going to adopt Equation 4 to determine bond returns on a hedged basis, 
implying there is a perfect hedge. 
4.1.3 Relative Measures 
Investors seek incremented returns. Simultaneously, enhanced returns are accompanied 
with more variability, namely risk. In an effort to facilitate investment management, 
several measures have been proposed. Sharpe (1994) introduced a ratio in order to ease 
portfolio comparisons. 
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The formula above, known as Sharpe ratio, compares excess returns of a portfolio 
against a benchmark (mostly the risk free rate of return) to relative risk, namely 
portfolio standard deviation. The result of the formula is excess returns per unit of risk. 
A rational investor opts for maximum excess returns for every unit of risk. The risk free 
ratio in the above formula can be replaced by any Minimum Acceptable Return (MAR). 
Fishburn (1977) utility function proposes that rational investors are risk-averse below 
the benchmark MAR and risk-neutral above the MAR. Apart from Sharpe ratio, the 
straightforward Return to Risk ratio will also be computed in the context of this project. 
While portfolio theory states that investors are rational to all their choices, behavioral 
finance disputes this argument. Tversky (1995) suggested that investor exhibit the 
tendency to make risk-averse choices in gains and risk-seeking choices in losses. This 
behavior results in the formation of suboptimal portfolios. If we want to depict this 
tendency, we end up with an S-shaped utility function, which suggests that investors are 
very risk-averse for small losses but, surprisingly, they are willing to take on 
investments with a small chance of very large losses. Statman (1998) argued that 
investors look for upside potential and simultaneously downside protection. Sortino et 
al. (1999) proposed a new measure, the Upside Potential Ratio (UPR). This ratio 
expresses the relationship of upside potential to downside variance of returns. The 
mathematical expression is: 
    
               
                  
   
 
Returns below the MAR are weighted quadratically, whereas returns above the MAR 
are weighted linearly. Investors opt for investment options that offer superior upside 
potential. Upside Potential Ratio will also be a part of our calculus, in chapter 5. 
4.2 Data 
For the purpose of this project we opted for government bond indices of US, UK, Japan, 
Canada, Germany, France and Italy. The countries were selected on the basis of their 
importance in the sovereign bond market, as presented in chapter two. All indices are 
derived from Bloomberg platform and they represent ten (10) year maturity bonds. By 
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applying indices in the calculus we attain to compute returns of coupon payments and 
capital gains simultaneously. Monthly observations were used. 
The period that will be covered extends from years 2003 to 2016. By incorporating this 
period in the analysis we accomplish the following: a) we capture both bull and bear 
economy phases (2003-2007 and 2008-2016 respectively) b) we study European bond 
market integration as the common European currency launched in the beginning of year 
2001 and gained popularity since then. 
We opted for a passive hedging strategy of “always hedge”. Hedging was applied via a 
rolling forward contract. We assumed a perfect hedge as illustrated in section 4.1.2 
(Equation 4). Currency returns and forward premiums required monthly observations of 
Spot and one month (1M) forward exchange rates of all currencies involved (US$, 
Canadian $, Japanese Yen, Great Britain Pound, Euro).  
Risk is measured in variance and standard deviation terms, while three month (3M) 
treasury US Bill, serves as a proxy for risk free rate. When modeling bond portfolios, 
term “international portfolio” stands for a non-US dollar equally weighted, whereas 
“global portfolio” stands for an equally weighted bond portfolio of all seven countries 
involved in the sample. The software used to derive results was Microsoft Excel. 
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5. Findings – Data Analysis 
 
Using the dataset as described in the previous section, we estimated the returns in US$ 
terms for unhedged and hedged positions. The analysis is provided in three 
chronological settings. Initially, results are derived for the entire period covering years 
2003-2016. The next step is to break down the period in two datasets to reevaluate the 
results under bull and bear market conditions. The fundamentals that lie behind this split 
are presented in chapter two. The bullish period covers years 2003-2007, whereas 
bearish period expands between years 2008-2016. 
5.1 Unhedged Returns in US $ 
In Table 7 the average returns of individual bond portfolios, as well as the 
corresponding international non US$ and global, both equally weighted, are depicted. 
The results are in US$ terms and there is no currency hedging applied. 
Table 7. Unhedged Returns in US$ - Period 2003-2016 
 Average Return Risk Return/Risk 
US -0.27% 9.27% -0.03 
UK 0.02% 11.33% 0.00 
Japan -2.28% 23.31% -0.10 
Canada -0.52% 9.00% -0.06 
Germany -1.93% 20.80% -0.09 
France -1.08% 17.28% -0.06 
Italy -0.53% 8.32% -0.06 
    
International -1.06% 9.62% -0.11 
Global -0.94% 9.04% -0.10 
 
The average return for the period 2003-2016 is negative for almost every individual 
bond market. US investors that opted for a domestic portfolio suffered losses -0.27%, 
which is the minimum negative performance of all markets. This performance is 
accompanied with minimum risk; just 9.27%. Only if they opted to invest solely in UK 
bonds, they would realize insignificant gains of 0.02%, or at least they would have no 
losses, since the figure is very close to zero. International and global portfolios recorded 
also losses of -1.06% and -0.94% respectively. The worst performance would be an 
investment in Japanese bond portfolio; an investor would have lost -2.28% and bear 
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23.31% risk. European markets did not offer an attractive alternative. Germany and 
France bond indices exhibited incremented variability. 
The period breakdown in two sub-periods, of bull and bear phases, provides some 
interesting results. Table 8 below depicts the unhedged returns in US$ terms for the sub-
period of 2003-2007. 
Table 8. Unhedged Returns in US$ - Period 2003-2007 
 Average Return Risk Return/Risk 
US 0.09% 6.16% 0.01 
UK 0.93% 3.36% 0.28 
Japan 0.95% 11.58% 0.08 
Canada 0.47% 4.48% 0.10 
Germany 0.59% 4.44% 0.13 
France 0.61% 4.41% 0.14 
Italy 0.63% 4.27% 0.15 
    
International 0.69% 3.92% 0.18 
Global 0.61% 0.16% 3.86 
 
The US investor would gain 0.95% which is the maximum performance, if invested 
solely in the Japanese market on an unhedged basis. Next best alternative would be the 
UK market following closely with 0.93%. However, if we incorporate risk in the 
analysis is obvious that the UK market provided superior performance, since it is a less 
risky investment. The return for each unit of risk is 0.28, significantly superior to the 
Japanese respective of 0.08. 
The formation of equally weighted portfolios, international (non US bond) and global 
(all seven bond markets) provides us with an interesting finding. If a US investor chose 
to invest, equally, to all seven markets he would have materialized positive returns with 
significantly less risk. The Return to Risk ratio jumps to 3.86 from 0.28, which was the 
best alternative when investing in a single market. 
Nevertheless the choice of a global portfolio would not materialize gains for the bearish 
phase of the economy. Table 9 presents return and risk figures for the sub-period of the 
turbulent years 2008-2016. 
  
[29] 
 
Table 9. Unhedged Returns in US$ - Period 2008-2016 
 Average Return Risk Return/Risk 
US -0.46% 10.63% -0.04 
UK -0.49% 13.90% -0.04 
Japan -4.08% 27.66% -0.15 
Canada -1.06% 10.70% -0.10 
Germany -3.34% 25.75% -0.13 
France -2.03% 21.28% -0.10 
Italy -1.17% 9.85% -0.12 
    
International -2.03% 11.54% -0.18 
Global -1.80% 1.18% -1.53 
 
The global portfolio recorded poor performance, whereas the US investor would have 
suffered minimum losses if he had invested solely in the US market. This choice is 
accompanied with significantly less risk of 10.63%. In this sub-period no positive 
returns are recorded for any individual market, while the worst return figure belongs to 
Japan. The Japanese market seems to be also the most risky investment, followed by 
European counterparts. 
Risk figures escalated in the second sub-period. Financial crisis caused variability in 
bond returns. Total variability stems from adverse macroeconomic conditions that 
affected bond pricing, as well as unfavorable exchange rate movements. Global 
portfolio minimized risk, probably as a result of portfolio theory arguments. However, it 
did not offer superior performance, as it did during the previous period (2003-2007).  
5.2 Hedged Returns in US$ 
This section presents the results of an “always hedge” strategy. The hedge comprised a 
one month rolling forward contract. This actually implies that return figures are split in 
two parts; the return stemming from bond price changes and the return owed to 
exchange rate changes.  
Table 10 presents the return and risk figures of a hedged position, for the period 2003-
2016. Attention should be drawn to risk figures and their changes in comparison to the 
unhedged equivalents (Table 7). 
  
[30] 
 
Table 10. Hedged Returns in US$ - Period 2003-2016 
 Average Return Risk Return/Risk 
US -0.27% 9.27% -0.03 
UK 0.12% 1.13% 0.10 
Japan -2.16% 5.31% -0.41 
Canada -0.64% 0.61% -1.06 
Germany -3.08% 5.03% -0.61 
France -1.06% 8.30% -0.13 
Italy -0.51% 0.66% -0.77 
    
International -1.22% 10.09% -0.12 
Global -1.09% 9.49% -0.11 
 
As in the case of the unhedged position, the UK bond market recorded superior return 
and risk figures in, as presented in Table 10. It is the only market that had positive 
returns in US$ terms, associated with risk figure of 1.13%, substantially less than 
11.33% of the respective unhedged position. This result stresses the importance of 
exchange rate risk. The US investor would realize no gains if invested either 
internationally or globally. The next best alternative is an individual US bond portfolio 
with -0.27% return and minimum risk of 9.27%. 
Risk and return figures are completely different when we study the same sample in the 
bullish sub-period, namely years 2003-2007. Table 11 encompasses these different 
results. Repeatedly, the Japanese market offers maximum average return of 1.12%, 
albeit incorporating risk of 1.27%. The best solution, as presented by the Return to Risk 
trade off, is the UK bond market. The relevant figure climbs up to 9.10 and represents, 
by far, the most attractive investment proposal. Both international and global portfolios 
recorded inferior returns of 0.27% and 0.24% respectively. The European market had 
not proved to be an attractive alternative, in either return or risk terms. 
Table 11. Hedged Returns in US$ - Period 2003-2007 
 Average Return Risk Return/Risk 
US 0.09% 6.16% 0.01 
UK 0.47% 0.05% 9.10 
Japan 1.12% 1.27% 0.88 
Canada -0.32% 0.15% -2.09 
Germany 0.09% 0.18% 0.51 
France 0.11% 0.51% 0.22 
Italy 0.13% 0.16% 0.82 
    
International 0.27% 3.97% 0.07 
Global 0.24% 4.11% 0.06 
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The bearish phase of the economy alters all return figures to negative, as presented in 
Table 12. The UK bond market remains the best choice, since it offers minimum loss of 
-0.08% with insignificant variability (1.74%). Repeatedly, international and global 
portfolios do not offer superior returns. 
Table 12. Hedged Returns in US$ - Period 2008-2016 
 Average Return Risk Return/Risk 
US -0.46% 10.63% -0.04 
UK -0.08% 1.74% -0.04 
Japan -3.94% 7.50% -0.53 
Canada -0.82% 0.86% -0.95 
Germany -4.80% 7.67% -0.63 
France -1.70% 12.61% -0.13 
Italy -0.85% 0.93% -0.91 
    
International -2.03% 10.92% -0.19 
Global -1.81% 10.40% -0.17 
 
If we compare risk figures of unhedged and hedged positions during the bullish market 
conditions, we observe a significant decrease. This stresses the importance of hedging 
strategies. However, the hedge did not prove to be adequate to combat adverse market 
conditions that prevailed in the market during years 2008-2016. All markets suffered 
losses ranging from -0.08% for the UK to -4.80% for the Japanese bond market. 
5.3 Efficient Frontier – International Bond Portfolios 
We assume that investors are risk averse utility maximizers. Therefore investor utility is 
positively related with higher returns after taking into account the risk, or alternatively, 
with minimum risk after taking into account the returns.  
We formed mixed portfolios comprised the US portfolio and the International portfolio 
in various weighted combinations. The starting point was 90% the US and 10% the 
International bond portfolio and the weights were adjusted by a 10% pace. If we want to 
depict these combinations for both hedged and unhedged positions, we end up with 
Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Efficient Frontier of Unhedged and Hedged Portfolios 2003-2016 
 
The unhedged portfolios outperform hedged equivalents. However, regardless of the 
analogy between US$ bond and International Bond portfolio, both cases (hedged and 
unhedged) record negative average returns. The best portfolio appears to be 90% US 
bond and 10% International for both positions (hedged and unhedged) with a Return to 
Risk ratio of -0.04. 
5.4 Market Integration 
The most common and straightforward statistic measure to estimate market integration 
is correlation coefficient. Figures that approximate unity reveal strong interdependence. 
On the other hand, figures close to zero or even better negative, reveal market 
disintegration and therefore unexploited diversification opportunities. 
5.4.1 Market Integration – Unhedged Returns 
Table 13 below depicts correlation coefficient of US returns against all other national 
markets for the whole period (2003-2016), as well as for the two sub-periods of bull and 
bear market circumstances. 
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Table 13. Correlation Coefficient – Unhedged Returns in US$ 
 
US 
 2003-2016 
2003-2007 2008-2016 
UK 0.344 0.156 0.367 
Japan  0.054 0.310 0.018 
Canada 0.782 0.662 0.804 
Germany 0.463 0.624 0.474 
France 0.578 0.587 0.597 
Italy 0.367 0.586 0.338 
 
As it was already pointed out in the literature review, geographical proximity is an 
important factor that affects investment decisions. Canada bond market exhibits 
increased correlation, implying enhanced integration. The two major European 
economies (Germany and France) follow, while Italy and UK bond market are 
positively related, albeit to a less extent. Only the Japanese bond returns are not found 
to be related either positively or negatively to the corresponding US. 
The period breakdown in two sub-periods exhibits similar positive correlation figures 
between US returns and Canadian, as well as European equivalents. Japan records an 
increased positive correlation only during the bullish period (2003-2007), whereas the 
UK bond market exhibits extremely low positive correlation to the US counterpart 
during the same period.  
Economic turbulence affects investment behavior. Returns of adjacent countries move 
extremely close (US and Canada), while the Japanese market seems to be independent 
of the US with a correlation coefficient of just 0.018. 
5.4.2 Market Integration – Hedged Returns 
Table 14 presents the correlation of US returns against all other bond markets, on a 
hedged basis. In this table we highlight the impressive positive correlation between US 
and Canada bond returns for the whole period, as well as for the two sub-periods. 
During tranquility years of 2003-2007 US bond returns exhibit an increased correlation 
against all six bond markets, especially though against the Canadian and the European. 
Japan is the less correlated market, particularly in turbulent times. 
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Table 14. Correlation Coefficient – Hedged Returns in US$ 
 
US 
 2003-2016 
2003-2007 2008-2016 
UK 0.307 0.409 0.314 
Japan  0.110 0.398 0.070 
Canada 0.845 0.848 0.849 
Germany 0.470 0.808 0.475 
France 0.602 0.778 0.612 
Italy 0.384 0.782 0.332 
 
5.5 Relative Return Measures 
Portfolio managers use many relative return measures to compare portfolios with 
different return and risk characteristics. Sharpe ratio compares excess returns (after 
deducting a risk free rate) to relevant portfolio risk, as it is implied by its standard 
deviation.  
Table 15. Sharpe Ratio International and Global Portfolios 
Portfolios 
2003-2016 2003-2007 2008-2016 
International non Hedged -0.090 -0.344 -0.051 
Global non Hedged -0.083 -9.110 -0.311 
    
International Hedged -0.102 -0.448 -0.055 
Global  Hedged -0.094 -0.438 -0.036 
 
None of the portfolios either hedged or not, recorded positive excess returns (Table 15). 
This occurs in the total period covering years 2003-2016, as well as in the two sub-
periods (2003-2007, 2008-2016). 
Individual bond markets also recorded negative figures, on an unhedged basis, for the 
whole period, as well as for the two sub-periods. Table 16 depicts the performances. 
Risk free average rate proved a better alternative for the US investor. 
Table 16. Sharpe Ratio - Individual Bond Markets – Unhedged Returns 
Portfolios 2003-2016 2003-2007 2008-2016 
US -0.049 -0.317 -0.178 
UK -0.016 -0.331 -0.139 
Japan -0.106 -0.095 -0.199 
Canada -0.079 -0.352 -0.233 
Germany -0.102 -0.328 -0.185 
France -0.074 -0.326 -0.163 
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Italy -0.087 -0.331 -0.265 
 
Negative results are also repeated on a hedged basis. Table 17 below, depicts Sharpe 
ratio for all individual markets. Repeatedly, the risk free rate proved the best alternative 
for the US investor. 
Table 17. Sharpe Ratio - Individual Bond Markets – Unhedged Returns 
Portfolios 2003-2016 2003-2007 2008-2016 
US -0.049 -0.317 -0.178 
UK -0.067 -30.653 -0.871 
Japan  -0.443 -0.731 -0.718 
Canada -1.381 -15.541 -2.615 
Germany -0.651 -10.883 -0.814 
France -0.151 -3.777 -0.249 
Italy -1.063 -11.741 -2.451 
 
Another relative return measure presented in the methodology section is Upside 
Potential Ratio (UPR). Since Sharpe ratios recorded negative figures for all intervals, 
the Minimal Acceptable Return (MAR) set for UPR, is 0%. Tables 18 and 19 below 
include ratios for individual, as well as for international (non US$) and global 
portfolios. 
Table 18. Upside Potential Ratio – Unhedged Returns 
Portfolios 2003-2016 2003-2007 2008-2016 
US 0.17 0.78 0.227 
UK 0.25 5.19 0.222 
Japan 0.04 0.61 0.034 
Canada 0.17 2.10 0.156 
Germany 0.05 1.44 0.046 
France 0.08 1.61 0.076 
Italy 0.12 1.78 0.104 
    
International 0.11 3.07 0.081 
Global 0.11 2.24 0.096 
 
As it is illustrated in Table 18, the UK bond market proves its superiority. Only in the 
sub-period 2008-2016, the US market possesses marginally greater upside potential. 
Table 19. Upside Potential Ratio – Hedged Returns 
Portfolios 2003-2016 2003-2007 2008-2016 
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US 0.17 0.78 0.23 
UK 0.36 6.91 0.32 
Japan 0.04 0.82 0.03 
Canada 0.13 0.64 0.18 
Germany 0.03 0.93 0.03 
France 0.07 0.96 0.07 
Italy 0.13 0.99 0.14 
    
International 0.08 1.05 0.08 
Global 0.08 1.00 0.08 
 
The same conclusion derives from Table 19. The UK bond market demonstrated 
superior upside potential for the whole sample period. This superiority is constant for 
the whole period, as well as for the two sub-periods. 
5.6 European Market Integration 
As part of this project, we also employ our dataset to appraise European bond market 
integration. Table 20 below, depicts correlation coefficient between German returns and 
France, as well as Italy counterparts. These returns are in common currency (Euro-€) 
terms, therefore exchange rate risk is expunged and other factors drive integration or 
disintegration appropriately.  
Table 20. Correlation Coefficient – European Bond Market 
 Germany 
Total 2003-2007 2008-2016 
France 0.679 0.989 0.562 
Italy 0.465 0.981 0.513 
 
If we look solely tranquility years 2003-2007, where the markets were under a bullish 
phase, European markets show almost perfect integration. Returns follow an identical 
pattern, as indicated from correlation coefficient, which approaches unity. Financial 
crisis alters this image dramatically. Correlation coefficient drops from 0.98 to 0.51-
0.56. This implies market disintegration. The German bond market proved a secure 
shelter and bond returns were disconnected from other European equivalents, even from 
those of major economies, such as France and Italy. 
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6. Interpretation of Findings 
 
This chapter interprets all findings presented so far and attempts to respond to specific 
research questions, already set in the outline of the project. Initially, the size and 
importance of the bond market is appraised. Our analysis then expands on the possible 
diversification opportunities that may exist, when forming foreign sovereign or 
international bond portfolios. A special focus is also placed on the European bond 
market integration. Lastly, the empirical results of this analysis are compared to 
Levich’s equivalent. 
6.1 Bond Market Features - Importance 
The second chapter of this project emphasized on the incremented importance of the 
sovereign bond market. The size of the sovereign debt outstanding is ballooning. 
Indicative figures are 32.3 US$ trillion at the end of 2009 and currently, 45.6 US$ 
trillion at the end of year 2016. As a result, there is an increasing popularity in relevant 
research, which is presented in the literature review section. 
Sovereign debt has serious implications to public finances. There are plenty of cases 
where countries face difficulties to refinance or issue new debt, to cover state needs. 
The most severe implication of increasing debt is that it affects future generation’s well 
being. If a country’s debt proves unsustainable, then sovereign bonds are priced 
accordingly, namely they are imposed to offer increased coupon payments. This has as a 
consequence that financial resources, which could be available to improve future 
generations well being, are consumed to debt servicing, worsening, ultimately, citizens 
living conditions. The worst scenario could also be the ban of access in financial 
markets to cover state financing needs, with severe outcomes to people’s everyday life. 
The recent examples of Argentina and Venezuela are characteristic. 
Contemporary research suggests that the turning point after which, debt affects growth 
rates negatively, is 90-100% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Checherita C and 
Rother P., 2010) .The economic variables that are affected by high debt to GDP ratio 
are private saving, public investment and welfare, total factor productivity, real and 
nominal interest rates. 
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Concerning the numerical data presented in the relevant section, it is apparent that the 
US bond market constitutes a crucial part of the total market. To be concise it represents 
nearly 37% of the total size of the market, according to recent data (Year 2016). 
Additionally, the vast number of individual and institutional US –based investors 
justifies the adoption of the US investor perspective in this analysis. 
6.2 Empirical Results and Implications 
Our empirical results suggest that a US investor would have realized maximum returns 
if he had invested in the UK market either on an unhedged or even on a hedged basis. 
Actually, the UK bond market was the only one which recorded positive average returns 
for the period 2003-2016. The UK market proved superior also when applying relative 
measures, such as Return to Risk ratio and Upside Potential Ratio. 
Hedging against currency risk reduced variability of returns substantially. Unhedged 
returns of the seven bond markets were characterized by an average variability of 
14.19%. This figure dwindles to 4.33% when the forward contract applies. This change 
emphasizes the importance of exchange rate risk as an obstacle to international 
investing. Nevertheless, returns did not flourish due to hedging, validating purchasing 
power parity theorem. 
The formation of equally weighted international and global portfolios did not offer a 
lucrative choice to the US investor. Consequently, our empirical results do not support 
the argument that benefits occur when allocating funds to many international bond 
markets. However, this conclusion could be revised if other investment allocation 
criteria than the naïve “equally weight” are applied. 
The period breakdown in two sub-periods, of bull and bear economy cycle, alters our 
observations, only partially. Initially, the first period of positive economic growth rates 
(2003-2007) records Japan as the superior bond market, in absolute average return 
figures. This is repeated on a hedged, as well as on an unhedged basis. However, if we 
consider that a typical investor is risk averse, then the optimal choice remains the UK 
bond market. The relevant Return to Risk figures are 0.28 and 9.10 on an unhedged and 
on a hedged basis respectively; both well above all other individual bond markets 
corresponding figures. The formation of equally weighted international and global 
portfolios proved inefficient for another time. Only when there is no hedge applied, 
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global portfolio outperforms all seven individual bond markets, recording a Return to 
Risk ratio of 3.86, which is the superior performance for this sub-period. 
The next sub-period of economic turmoil (2008-2016) alters average returns 
dramatically, as expected. The US investor who did not hedge, would have realized less 
damage if he had invested domestically, since the US market recorded the minimum 
negative average return of -0.46%. The respective hedged position classifies US and 
UK equally, when employing the Return to Risk ratio. In absolute return figures, UK 
bond market recorded minimum losses of -0.08%. International and global portfolios 
did not prove their hypothetical superiority. 
The question of unexploited diversification opportunities finds its answer in the 
correlation coefficient tables. US bond market returns against six remainder equivalents 
records an average correlation coefficient of 0.43 (unhedged position) and 0.45 (hedged 
position). This implies that returns of individual bond markets move to the same 
direction only partially. Consequently, there is scope for diversification according to 
portfolio theory. Fund managers could exploit these opportunities and offer robust 
performance to their clients, irrespective of market conditions. On the other hand, the 
observed market segmentation fosters sovereign interest rates and attaches additional 
debt burden. The implications, already discussed, are significant especially for future 
generation’s well being. Policy makers should take into consideration these implications 
and identify common macroeconomic or / and other variables that can drive interest 
rates to low levels, enabling them to deliver improved prospects to future generations. 
Outlier observations in the correlation coefficient tables are those of the Japanese 
market, which is extremely low correlated with the US. On the contrary, Canadian 
market records significant positive correlation with the US. These outlier observations 
support the case that geographical proximity affects investment decision making. 
Financial crisis exhibited some other interesting trends. European markets correlation of 
returns dropped significantly (cases of Germany and Italy) or remained stable (case of 
France). The UK market seems to have its own characteristics; the crisis caused 
increased correlation with US returns. Canada as an adjacent market follows the US 
very closely (the coefficient jumps to 0.804), whereas the Japanese market seems to 
follow its own pace, with a coefficient near to zero. These geography-related 
correlations could have serious implications to portfolio synthesis. Fund managers may 
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use this piece of evidence for dynamic portfolio adjustment, in fluctuating market 
conditions. 
The construction of mixed US and International portfolios with an initial analogy of 
90%-10% that changes with a pace of 10%, did not unveil a portfolio with superior 
characteristics. Maybe, the criterion of “equally weight” is not proper when forming 
international and global portfolios. A careful analysis of the results could substantiate an 
investment allocation criterion that could allow investors to fully grasp the merits of 
international investing. 
6.3 European Market Integration 
Our results confirm that European market exhibited strong signs of integration during 
the years of positive growth rates. Euro became an important currency in world trade, 
just after the US dollar. The crisis contagion brought from the US at the beginning of 
year 2008, altered this trend. Suddenly, weak European economies lost access to 
financial markets. An abundance of funds flew to quality assets mainly to the European 
core countries (especially Germany). The crisis divided European Union in two groups; 
the dominating north and the dependent south. 
This situation is reflected in the table of results. Correlation coefficient was nearly unity 
during bull period. Financial crisis segmented the European market. Apart from the 
fiscal imbalances this causes, there are appearing diversification opportunities in the 
European bond market. Investors can diversify their portfolios with a mixture of 
European bonds.  
Nevertheless, policy makers must pay attention to this trend which affects public 
finances and has serious political implications. Fiscal imbalances had impact on welfare 
and macroeconomic variables, such as unemployment. Young generations were 
asymmetrically affected and feel isolated. Nationalism flourishes and European Union 
structure is –after a long time- seriously questioned.  
6.4 Results vs Levich (2001) 
As already mentioned, this work followed the same pattern with the respective of 
Levich (2001). Levich studied eight bond markets adopting the perspective of a US 
investor for the period starting January 1978 to September 1989.  
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Apparently the conditions in the world markets were quite different. Globalization was 
just starting and bond markets were not so popular. The returns of the US bond market 
on an unhedged basis classified it in the fourth place. However, if risk was taken into 
consideration, the US bond market proved a superior choice, with better Return to Risk 
ratio. 
The correlation of US returns against the remainder seven counterparts appeared to be 
extremely low, ranging from 0.38 to 0.55. The formation of international and global 
portfolios (equally and value weighted) proved an attractive option, since they scored 
significantly less risk figures with approximately same return to the US equivalent. The 
Return to Risk for the value-weighted, non-US dollar, international portfolio was 0.18, 
significantly more than the 0.11 of the US bond portfolio. 
The currency hedging had no clear effects on the returns, whereas it clearly depressed 
risk figures by more than 50%. The US bond market was again in the fourth position 
based on return terms. Returns of four markets exceeded the respective unhedged. 
Hedging improved radically Return to Risk ratios for all markets, divulging many 
attractive investment opportunities apart from the US bond market. 
The built up of the efficient frontier of international portfolios pointed out that an 
unhedged portfolio weighted about 30% to 40% of the international non US$ portfolios 
and the remainder invested in US bonds, would have maximized the Return to Risk 
ratio. Hedged portfolios of this efficient frontier clearly dominate unhedged equivalents, 
offering augmented returns per unit of risk. 
Comparing these key remarks with our evidence, it is observed that market integration 
advanced. Correlation coefficient of US$ bond returns against all other markets is above 
of Levich’s observations, especially in the trouble-free period of years 2003-2007. US 
bond market returns found to be highly correlated to Canadian equivalents, with figures 
ranging from 0.78 (unhedged position) to 0.84 (hedged position). 
In absolute return figures the US bond market scores second, just after the UK. This is 
valid for both unhedged and hedged position and envisages an improved performance of 
the US bond market. In relative terms, the UK market offers superior results, since it is 
the only market that recorded a positive outcome in the period 2003-2016. This actually 
implies an impressive rebound for the UK bond market.  
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The equally weighted, unhedged, global portfolio, which is comprised of all seven 
markets, clearly dominates in the tranquility period of 2003-2007, recording a 3.86 
Return to Risk ratio. However this is not observed consistently. International and global 
portfolios fail to deliver an improved Return to Risk ratio, against individual bond 
markets. Indicative superiority of single bond market is the currency hedged UK bond 
portfolio, which offers 9.1 Return to Risk ratio, during the exact same period, the 
maximum figure ever recorded. 
Currency hedging also suppressed risk figures dramatically, whereas return figures 
remained relatively stable. In contradiction to Levich (2001), international and global 
portfolios offered negative returns and did not proved to be a valuable alternative to 
investors. Hedged and unhedged portfolios of the respective efficient frontier are 
offering almost identical return and risk, with the unhedged being marginally a better 
choice. This also contradicts Levich findings, where hedged portfolios clearly 
dominated respective unhedged. 
All combinations of US bonds and non-US international portfolios recorded negative 
returns and failed to provide an attractive Return to Risk trade off. Consequently, no 
free lunch was observed. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
This chapter stresses key findings and provides answers to all research questions raised 
in the project outline. In this context, we initially embarked on a study of the sovereign 
bond market during the last fourteen years. The importance of the market was 
highlighted, using statistical data. The sovereign bond market became a crucial part of 
the global financial system. The US remains the largest part of the total market, 
followed by Japan. The market share, the size and importance of institutional and 
individual investors portray the rationale to opt for the US investor perspective when 
processing our dataset. Apart from these reasons, this perspective eases direct 
comparison to previous equivalent research work of Levich (2001), since similar 
methodology was adopted. 
The sample period, comprised years 2003-2016, was seriously influenced by the 
unstable years of financial distress, namely years 2008-2016. Nearly all individual bond 
markets recorded negative average returns, except from the UK. The formation of 
international (non US$) and global portfolios did not alter return figures. This 
observation was repeated on unhedged, as well as on hedged basis. The international 
and global portfolios synthesis was limited to an equally weighted basis. There is scope 
for alternative portfolio formations, if dynamic adjustment strategies are applied, that 
could alter initial conclusions.  
Exchange rate risk remains important and is combated by hedging strategies. However, 
the results imply that exchange rate parities, when hedged, are not in position to 
seriously affect –in any direction- return figures, in the long run. At this point it must be 
noted that the currency hedging strategy applied in this analysis, implied a perfect 
hedge, something quite unobservable in real circumstances. 
Market integration advanced; moreover is characterized by special features, like 
geographical proximity. The correlation coefficient of US$ returns with those of Canada 
and Japan are characteristic cases. Canadian returns imitate –to a great extent- US 
respective with a coefficient of 0.78, which augments to 0.80 in turbulent years. On the 
other hand, the Japanese market seems to be quite independent with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.05, which decreases further in turbulent years to 0.01. This behavior is 
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supportive to Hunter and Simon (2004) empirical evidence. Financial crisis does not 
affect all markets uniformly. Canada and UK demonstrate increased correlation, 
whereas European and Japan bond markets react in an opposite manner. The argument 
that bond markets, in contradiction to equity equivalents, do not react uniformly during 
turbulent periods, is validated. 
No “free lunch” seems to be offered in the long run to investors, validating Rosenberg 
(2010), who argued that, when observed, is a sample figment. Only in one case the 
global portfolio is the best alternative choice. This happens in the 2003-2007 sub-
period, offering a 3.86 Return to Risk ratio. 
European markets witnessed almost absolute integration during 2003-2007. When the 
financial crisis burst out, crucial differences in macroeconomic variables segmented the 
market. The correlation coefficient of the German bond market returns against other 
European market’s returns dropped from the impressive 0.98 to 0.56 (in the case of 
France) or even 0.51 (in the case of Italy). 
Empirical results of this project contradict, to a great extent, to Levich’s (2001) 
suggestions. Evolving market conditions and economy cycles seem to play a vital role 
in this contradicting view.  
Concluding, sovereign bond market is gaining popularity. Bonds do not exhibit similar 
behavior to equities. Financial crisis causes less interdependence between bond markets, 
contrary to common belief. Empirical evidence supports the existence of diversification 
opportunities in bond markets, despite ongoing globalization procedure. Currency 
hedging depresses risk figures but does not affect returns systematically to any direction 
(either positive, or negative). Lastly, European bond markets integration lost its pace 
due to financial distress. This fact has serious political consequences, affecting 
ultimately European political integration. 
Future research should emphasize on the variables that lie behind bond market 
segmentation. The identification of such variables could assist policy makers to combat 
increased interest rates that pass debt burden to future generations and affect negatively 
their prospects of living. From an investor point of view, these diversification 
opportunities occurring in the market are a valuable, vital part of their portfolio forming 
strategies.  
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Appendix 
 
Risk Figures were based on the following Variance – Covariance Matrices 
Unhedged Returns in US$ 
Whole Period 
 
US UK Japan  Canada Germany France Italy 
US 0.0086       
UK 0.0036 0.0128 0.0000 0.0032 0.0060 0.0058 0.0024 
Japan  0.0012  0.0543 0.0013 0.0147 -0.0064 0.0010 
Canada 0.0065   0.0081 0.0097 0.0093 0.0034 
Germany 0.0060    0.0428 0.0204 0.0090 
France 0.0092     0.0299 0.0095 
Italy 0.0028      0.0069 
 
2003-2007 
 US UK Japan  Canada 
German
y France Italy 
US 0.0038             
UK 0.0003 0.0011 0.0007 0.0005 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 
Japan  0.0022   0.0134 0.0014 0.0010 0.0010 0.0009 
Canada 0.0018     0.0020 0.0012 0.0011 0.0010 
Germany 0.0017       0.0020 0.0019 0.0018 
France 0.0016         0.0019 0.0018 
Italy 0.0015           0.0018 
 
2008-2016 
 US UK Japan  Canada 
German
y France Italy 
US 0.0113             
UK 0.0054 0.0193 -0.0007 0.0046 0.0087 0.0084 0.0033 
Japan  0.0005   0.0765 0.0009 0.0216 -0.0110 0.0008 
Canada 0.0091     0.0115 0.0142 0.0137 0.0047 
Germany 0.0127       0.0651 0.0302 0.0128 
France 0.0134         0.0453 0.0136 
Italy 0.0035           0.0097 
 
  
[50] 
 
Hedged Returns in US$ 
Whole Period 
 US UK Japan  Canada Germany France Italy 
US 0.0086             
UK 0.0030 0.0113 0.0003 0.0015 0.0027 0.0037 0.0014 
Japan  0.0023   0.0531 0.0018 0.0134 -0.0052 0.0012 
Canada 0.0061     0.0061 0.0283 0.0169 0.0063 
Germany 0.0097       0.0503 0.0192 0.0058 
France 0.0092         0.0278 0.0083 
Italy 0.0029           0.0066 
 
2003-2007 
 US UK Japan  Canada Germany France Italy 
US 0.0038             
UK 0.0006 0.0005 0.0009 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
Japan  0.0027   0.0127 0.0017 0.0018 0.0018 0.0017 
Canada 0.0020     0.0015 0.0013 0.0013 0.0012 
Germany 0.0021       0.0018 0.0017 0.0016 
France 0.0020         0.0017 0.0016 
Italy 0.0019           0.0016 
 
2008-2016 
 US UK Japan  Canada Germany France Italy 
US 0.0112             
UK 0.0043 0.0172 -0.0002 0.0021 0.0038 0.0054 0.0019 
Japan  0.0020   0.0743 0.0017 0.0188 -0.0093 0.0008 
Canada 0.0082     0.0085 0.0123 0.0120 0.0038 
Germany 0.0137       0.0760 0.0284 0.0078 
France 0.0131         0.0419 0.0118 
Italy 0.0034           0.0093 
 
